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PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS AFTER CONAGRA
Steven Czak*
This Note examines the continuing harms of lead-based paint and attempts
by cities and states to hold manufacturers and distributors liable for
abatement under the public nuisance doctrine. Such suits have stretched
traditional conceptions of public nuisance, particularly on the threshold
issue of whether pervasive lead paint in residences infringes on a common
right held by the public. This Note reviews the major lead paint public
nuisance cases from across the country. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in
each case for a variety of reasons until ten California counties prevailed in
People v. ConAgra in November 2017. While subsequently reduced by the
appellate court, and further reduced in a postjudgment settlement, the trial
court initially awarded the plaintiffs a staggering $1.15 billion in abatement
funds. Across the six states that have adjudicated such cases, there exists a
great discontinuity not only in outcome but also in the manner by which each
state court reached its decision.
This Note proposes that future state courts follow the approach taken by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court in carefully adhering to the historical
boundaries of public nuisance and deferring to the legislature when the
amorphous tort is used as an attempt to remedy a complex social issue.
Given that no common right exists among private homeowners to be free of
lead paint, as traditionally conceived under the doctrine, the claim of public
nuisance is simply inapposite. ConAgra impermissibly expanded the bounds
of public nuisance by finding a common right where none exists and should
not be followed by future courts when adjudicating public nuisance claims.
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INTRODUCTION
This famous Dutch Boy Lead of mine
Can make this playroom fairly shine
Let’s start our painting right away
You’ll find the work is only play1

Almost a century ago, a child may have stumbled across this poem in a
coloring book published by NL Industries, Inc. (NL), once a major producer
of lead products.2 The pictures inside showed children sprucing up their
playroom by painting with NL’s Dutch Boy White Lead paint.3 The
advertisement’s message was apparent: use NL’s lead paint products for
interior painting, from walls to window sills and even cribs. As if that were
not obvious enough, the coloring book also encouraged children to give an
attached coupon for Dutch Boy paint to their parents.4
It is arguable whether NL knew at the time that its products could poison
children.5 Today, however, there is no dispute about the life-altering harms
of lead paint. Even minimal lead exposure can stunt cognitive and behavioral
1. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 541 (Ct. App. 2017)
(quoting NL Industries, Inc.’s 1929 “paint book” for children).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 533–34.
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development in children and can lead to a host of ailments in both children
and adults.6 In 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
changed its benchmark “level of concern”—then at ten micrograms per
deciliter of lead in the blood—to a “reference value” of five micrograms
because “no safe blood level . . . has been identified.”7 Concurrently, the
CDC shifted toward a policy of “primary prevention” for lead exposure,
which encourages removing hazards before they can manifest into harms, as
opposed to simply mitigating the harms by covering up the lead paint with
new paint.8 Despite a federal ban on lead paint in 1978,9 millions of homes
across the United States still contain the deadly toxin.10 At least four million
children live in these homes today, with at least half a million of those
between the ages of one and five experiencing blood lead levels that exceed
the CDC’s threshold for recommending public health actions.11 For a
product banned almost half a century ago, the dangers of residential lead
paint remain substantial.
Given the pervasiveness of the problem and the abatement costs borne by
communities, a number of cities and states began bringing public nuisance
suits in the early 2000s against lead paint producers for their promotion and
creation of a public harm.12 Employing the public nuisance doctrine in the
mass torts context was unheard of until only a few decades ago.13 However,
following a massive settlement with the tobacco industry in 1998, negotiated
under the threat of such novel claims, states felt empowered to sue
corporations like gun manufacturers and lead paint companies for their roles
in creating widespread public harms.14 Most of the cases against lead paint
manufacturers and distributors have failed, though for a variety of reasons.15
However, in November 2017, California’s Sixth Appellate Division upheld

6. Blood Lead Levels in Children, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/blood-lead-levels.htm
[https://perma.cc/TB4JWWVK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); Lead Poisoning, MAYO CLINIC, https://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/symptoms-causes/syc-20354717
[https://perma.cc/K6L9-TTL9] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
7. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC RESPONSE TO ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION 1–5 (2012), https://
www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/acclpp/cdc_response_lead_exposure_recs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
BB3N-F3MD].
8. See Blood Lead Levels in Children, supra note 6.
9. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing LeadContaining Paint, 16 C.F.R. § 1303 (2019).
10. Protect Your Family from Exposures to Lead, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/lead/protect-your-family-exposures-lead
[https://perma.cc/245GREBR] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
11. Lead in Paint, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://
www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/sources/paint.htm [https://perma.cc/4NRM-PC5M] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2019).
12. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 741, 770 (2003).
13. Id. at 743.
14. Id. at 743, 770.
15. See infra Part II.

1064

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

key findings in People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co.,16 in which ten
counties prevailed under the public nuisance doctrine against three lead paint
companies that had promoted the use of their products in the interiors of
residential homes.17 The trial court ordered the defendants to pay $1.15
billion in abatement costs,18 though the appellate court remanded for
recalculation as it found the defendants liable for a shorter period.19 Both the
California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the
defendants’ writs of certiorari.20 The parties ultimately reached a
postjudgment settlement in which the defendants agreed to pay the ten
counties a total of $305 million, finally ending the nearly two-decades-long
litigation.21
The ConAgra decision may encourage similar lawsuits in states that have
yet to address whether lead paint companies can be held liable under the
public nuisance doctrine, as well as other suits that would seek to employ the
theory in new mass harm contexts.22 As the Chamber of Commerce stated
in its amicus brief supporting ConAgra in the company’s petition to the U.S.
Supreme Court, “at least 80 new public nuisance cases of this sort have been
filed by states and other government entities against American businesses,
all seeking to impose sweeping liability based on similarly novel theories.”23
Considering that tort law is almost exclusively state law, one can expect an
even greater number of cases to be filed in states, like California, whose
highest courts have tended to be more plaintiff-friendly in nontraditional tort
cases.24 Indeed, only three months after ConAgra, the cities of San Francisco
and Oakland filed a major public nuisance suit against five of the world’s
largest oil companies, claiming that they heavily marketed and sold fossil
fuels despite their knowledge that the fuels contributed to global warming.25
The two cities allege that they have suffered substantial harms, particularly
coastal flooding, because of the defendants’ actions over many decades.26
16. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Ct. App. 2017).
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 598.
20. Press Release, James R. Williams, Cty. Counsel, Office of Cty. Counsel, California
Counties and Cities Announce Groundbreaking $305 Million Settlement of Landmark Lead
Paint Litigation (July 17, 2019), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/cco/leadpaint/Documents/
July%2017%2c%202019%20Press%20Release%20-%20Settlement%20of%20Landmark%
20Lead%20Paint%20Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4FE-AWZV].
21. Id.
22. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
in Support of Petitioners at 13–14, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct. 377
(2018) (No. 18-84) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce].
23. Id.
24. California has been a pioneer in tort law, especially where there is clearly a harm but
it is difficult to hold defendants liable under traditional doctrines. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (adopting market share liability); Rowland v. Christian, 443
P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (introducing a multifactor test to replace the traditional tripartite
framework of premises liability).
25. California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 27, 2018).
26. Id.
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While the tort element of causation is notoriously elusive,27 varies by
jurisdiction, particularly between progressive and conservative states,28 and
is partly responsible for the disparate outcomes in these lead paint public
nuisance claims,29 there remains an even more fundamental question as to
whether lead paint companies have infringed on a “public right.”30 Under
the public nuisance doctrine, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant unreasonably interfered “with a right common to the general
public.”31 Rhode Island characterized this component as the sine qua non of
any public nuisance claim, for, without it, the suit can only be brought as a
private action.32 California in ConAgra clearly found that the public had a
right to be free from lead paint in their homes as it interfered with their access
to essential community resources;33 Rhode Island found the exact opposite.34
Two other states—Illinois and Missouri—denied relief without expressly
deciding whether a public right exists, as they found the claims insufficient
on the basis of causation.35 Finally, Wisconsin allowed a jury to answer the
question, which it did in the affirmative,36 while New Jersey simply accepted
that a public right did exist because of a state statute declaring residential
lead paint a public nuisance.37 However, in both states, the plaintiffs yet
again failed.38 Across these six states, there now exists a wide range of both
approaches and outcomes, including on the threshold requirement of the
existence of a public right.
This Note explores whether the public has a common right to be free from
lead paint in their homes and whether communities should be able to recover
abatement funds through nuisance claims. Part I discusses the evolution of
public nuisance from English common law through its historical applications
in American jurisprudence. This Part continues by discussing its relatively
recent use in mass torts, with a particular emphasis on what constitutes a
common right. This Part then concludes by discussing the hazards of
residential lead paint, examining why many states have employed the public
nuisance doctrine against lead paint companies in an attempt to spread
abatement costs.

27. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985).
28. See City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007)
(explaining that the Missouri Supreme Court was unwilling to adopt a more flexible causation
standard like California’s “substantial factor” test).
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. Just as most courts have done, this Note uses the terms “public right” and “common
right” interchangeably.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
32. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 447 (R.I. 2008).
33. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 552 (Ct. App. 2017).
34. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 453.
35. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005);
Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); City of St. Louis v.
Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116–17 (Mo. 2007).
36. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 764 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
37. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499 (N.J. 2007).
38. Id. at 505–06; NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d at 784.
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Part II reviews the case law of a number of states where courts have
adjudicated lead paint public nuisance claims. It begins with an overview of
the existing statutory landscape regarding lead paint abatement and then
reviews the disparate analytical approaches employed by the courts of the six
states and their divergent outcomes.
Finally, Part III proposes a solution to these inconsistencies that calls on
future state courts to follow the approach taken by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in closely observing the tort’s historical boundaries. This analysis
should lead other states to find that pervasive lead paint in private homes,
while harmful and unfortunate, does not infringe upon a right held in
common by the public.
I. PUBLIC NUISANCE: FROM THE KING’S ROADS TO LEAD-BASED PAINT
To understand why states have lodged public nuisance suits against lead
paint manufacturers, it is necessary to understand both the specific harm that
governments have sought to abate and the development of the cause of action.
Part I.A provides background on the hazards of lead-based paint and its
stubborn persistence in residences today. Part I.B discusses the origins of
nuisance actions, both private and public, at common law and the traditional
application of public nuisance doctrine in the United States. Part I.C then
analyzes how and why local governments and states began employing public
nuisance in the mass tort context a few decades ago, including against lead
paint manufacturers.
A. The Harms and Pervasiveness of Lead-Based Paint
Lead is an abundant, versatile heavy metal that mankind has employed for
millennia.39 Since those earliest days, lead has been detrimental to human
health. The first known cases of lead poisoning date back over 2300 years to
the Roman Empire, when lead was commonly used in water pipes and
pottery.40 The problem became more prevalent during the Industrial
Revolution as Western societies rapidly modernized and employed the metal
in a vast array of new industries, like smelting and printing.41 With the
advent of the automobile and lead-based gasoline in the early twentieth
century, the presence of lead became ubiquitous.42 By the 1970s, the federal
government finally recognized the serious health risks associated with lead
exposure and took affirmative steps to reduce its use, including banning leadbased paint and leaded gasoline.43 While undoubtedly positive steps, the
39. Shilu Tong et al., Environmental Lead Exposure: A Public Health Problem of Global
Dimensions, 78 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1068, 1068–69
(2000),
https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78(9)1068.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NCF9DURK].
40. Id. at 1068.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1069.
43. See Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 100-572, 84 Stat. 2078
(1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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bans came more than a century and a half after the scientific community
recognized the dangers of lead, and almost a century after some European
countries first implemented regulations to prevent lead poisoning.44
Despite the actions taken decades ago, lead poisoning remains a major
public health issue today.45 Common sources of lead include paint that has
not been removed from older homes; soil, especially near industrial facilities
that operate with lead; and lead pipes in water distribution systems.46 Less
common sources include folk medicines, lead ammunition in firearms, and
inexpensive toys or jewelry from underdeveloped countries.47 Dust is the
most common means of lead exposure and is often created when lead paint
deteriorates inside a residence, or from lead particles that are disturbed in the
soil.48 Individuals can also ingest lead particles through the air or water.49
For example, Flint, Michigan experienced a water crisis in 2014 and 2015
when it began drawing water from a new source without using proper
corrosion control.50 Lacking a critical protective chemical, when the water
flowed to homes through the city’s antiquated lead pipes, it slowly ate away
at the pipes, causing lead particles to be deposited into the water.51 In some
instances, lead levels were hundreds of times higher than the government’s
minimum safety levels.52 The catastrophe led Michigan to declare a state of
emergency and activate its national guard to assist in distributing bottled
water to residents.53 However, significant havoc had already been wreaked.
One study found that the crisis led to a nearly 70 percent increase in the
number of children under the age of five with blood levels greater than the
CDC’s reference value.54
The symptoms of lead poisoning generally do not become apparent until a
person has already accumulated high levels of lead in her blood.55 In adults,
elevated lead levels and lead poisoning can cause a variety of symptoms
including high blood pressure, mood disorders, and memory impairment.56
For those seeking to conceive, excessive lead levels can reduce sperm count
44. Tong et al., supra note 39, at 1068.
45. Id. at 1073.
46. Sources of Lead, N.Y. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/
environmental/lead/sources.htm [https://perma.cc/3KLQ-GTK6] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Terese M. Olson et al., Forensic Estimates of Lead Release from Lead Service Lines
During the Water Crisis in Flint, Michigan, 4 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. LETTERS 356, 356 (2017).
51. Id.
52. Id. (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency’s “action level” is 15
micrograms per liter and that some findings in Flint exceeded 5000 micrograms per liter).
53. State of Emergency Declared in the City of Flint, CITY FLINT MICH.,
https://www.cityofflint.com/state-of-emergency [https://perma.cc/BMC8-77ZU] (last visited
Nov. 12, 2019).
54. Hernán F. Gómez et al., Blood Lead Levels of Children in Flint, Michigan: 2006–
2016, 197 J. PEDIATRICS 158, 160 (2018) (providing quantitative data indicating that 3.7
percent of this demographic had elevated blood levels in 2016 compared to 2.2 percent in
2014).
55. Lead Poisoning, supra note 6.
56. Id.
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or create abnormal sperm in men and can increase the chances of a
miscarriage or stillbirth in women.57 In Flint, two researchers noted a 12
percent decrease in the fertility rate, a 58 percent increase in the fetal death
rate, and an overall decrease in health of newborns in the city as compared to
the rest of the state during the time of the water crisis.58
While the effects of lead poisoning in adults are serious, the hazards for
children are even more pressing as their bodies are still developing, therefore
posing potentially lifelong consequences.59 The American Academy of
Pediatrics notes that lead exposure can damage a child’s nervous system,
bring about behavior problems, and stunt cognitive development.60
Specifically, children exposed to high concentrations of lead are much more
likely to have “impaired verbal concept formation, poor grammatical
reasoning, and poor command following.”61 Researchers have also noted an
inverse relationship between blood lead levels and childhood IQ scores.62
Not only are the harms in children more pronounced, children are also much
more susceptible than adults to lead poisoning from lead-based paint. As the
appellate court in ConAgra reiterated from the evidence presented at trial,
children “explore their environment with typical hand-to-mouth contact
behavior” and learn quickly that “lead paint chips ‘taste sweet.’”63 Indeed,
many of the earliest cases of childhood lead poisoning in the United States
occurred when infants ingested flakes from the paint that lined their cribs.64
During a Wisconsin trial in which the City of Milwaukee brought a public
nuisance suit against a number of manufacturers, one expert witness testified
that the first known case of childhood lead paint poisoning dates back to
1914.65 In that instance, a young child suffered from seizures and fell into a
coma after ingesting chunks of lead paint from his crib.66 More than a

57. Id.
58. Daniel S. Grossman & David J. G. Slusky, The Effect of an Increase in Lead in the
Water System on Fertility and Birth Outcomes: The Case of Flint, Michigan 1 (W. Va. Univ.
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 17-25, Aug. 7, 2017), https://
researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=econ_workingpapers [https://perma.cc/PCT2-FXW9 ].
59. Jaime Raymond & Mary Jean Brown, Childhood Blood Levels in Children Aged <5
Years—United States, 2009–2014, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jan. 20, 2017, at 1,
1, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/pdfs/ss6603.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W77WFL7].
60. Lead Exposure in Children, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, https://www.aap.org/enus/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/lead-exposure/Pages/Lead-Exposure-inChildren.aspx [https://perma.cc/BB9H-32M9] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
61. Lisa H. Mason et al., Pb Neurotoxicity: Neuropsychological Effects of Lead Toxicity,
BIOMED RES. INT’L, Jan. 2014, at 1, 4.
62. Gómez et al., supra note 54, at 158.
63. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 515 (Ct. App. 2017).
See generally Scott Clark et al., Urban Lead Exposures of Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, 26
CHEMICAL SPECIATION & BIOAVAILABILITY 163 (1991).
64. ConAgra, 227 Cal Rptr. 3d at 519–20.
65. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
66. Id.
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century later, hand-to-mouth ingestion of lead paint chips is still the leading
cause of childhood lead poisoning.67
The government’s initiatives to reduce the presence of lead beginning in
the late 1970s had definitive and positive effects, especially for those most at
risk.68 In its most recent multiyear study conducted across approximately
thirty jurisdictions, the CDC found encouraging data that average blood lead
levels in children continue to decline.69 However, the hazards presented by
lead have not been eradicated. The same CDC report noted at least 75,000
confirmed cases of elevated blood lead levels in children under the age of
five in a single year.70 Given that the agency does not collect statistics from
every state, in addition to complexities stemming from disparate approaches
to screening and reporting in each state, one group of researchers has
suggested that the CDC may only be capturing half of the actual number of
children with elevated blood lead levels.71 Whatever the exact number, it is
clear that lead continues to pose serious health risks for tens of thousands of
young children today.72
The Environmental Protection Agency warns those who live in a home
built prior to 1978 that there is a “good chance” it contains lead paint.73
Specifically, the agency estimates that 24 percent of homes constructed
between 1960 and 1977, 69 percent constructed between 1940 and 1959, and
87 percent constructed before 1940 still contain lead paint.74 According to a
2011 study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, this
equates to approximately 37 million homes, of which more than 23 million
contain lead paint in a deteriorated, dangerous condition.75 Of the nearly
16.8 million households that have a child younger than the age of six, 21
percent, or 3.6 million total, contain serious lead hazards.76 Less affluent
households, including those receiving government aid, are “significantly
more likely” to have lead hazards than affluent households.77
One of the main reasons why lead paint continues to be so prevalent,
despite having been banned nearly fifty years ago, is the high cost of

67. Raymond & Brown, supra note 59, at 6.
68. Id. at 6–7.
69. Id. at 6.
70. Id.
71. Eric M. Roberts et al., Assessing Child Lead Poisoning Case Ascertainment in the US,
1999–2010, PEDIATRICS, May 2017, at 1, 1.
72. See At-Risk Populations, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/populations.htm [https://perma.cc/BEA4-P7AA]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019).
73. See Protect Your Family from Exposures to Lead, supra note 10.
74. Id.
75. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HEALTHY HOMES SURVEY: LEAD AND
ARSENIC FINDINGS, at ES-1 (2011), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/AHHS_
REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/WKE8-LKNC].
76. Id. at ES-2.
77. Id.
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removal.78 To avoid removal costs, many homeowners choose instead to
mitigate the risk by applying an encapsulant over the old lead paint to prevent
it from deteriorating.79 These concerns about the costs of abatement and who
should bear them lie at the heart of the divide over whether public nuisance
law is a proper vehicle for communities seeking redress for the pervasive
presence of lead paint.80
B. Public Nuisance at Common Law and Historically in the United States
Public nuisance claims had not been lodged in the mass tort context until
relatively recently.81 Part I.B.1 provides a general overview of both the
private and public nuisance doctrines, including the requisite “common
right” element for the latter type of claim. Part I.B.2 then discusses the
historical evolution of public nuisance and some prototypical cases to help
define the tort’s traditional boundaries in American jurisprudence.
1. Absence of Precise Definitions
In its simplest form, nuisance is not simply conduct or a condition, but
instead an “invasion of an interest” held by private individuals or by the
greater community.82 Developed as an outgrowth of the assize of disseisin
in the thirteenth century,83 nuisance could be brought through one of three
actions: the assize of nuisance, the writ of nuisance, or criminal
presentments.84 The line between civil and criminal was not clear, which is
unsurprising as early common law was notoriously ambiguous about the
difference between public and private wrongs.85 Regardless of whether the
law originally treated it as a tort or a crime, nuisance was a necessary
development in the early English legal system in that it filled the gap between
disseisin, which protected against the wrongful dispossession of land, and
trespass, which protected against the physical incursion of land.86 The initial
differences are, however, important in the development of the modern
distinction between public and private nuisance. The latter tracks generally
from the assize and writ of nuisance, while the former largely arose from
78. See Order re: Recalculation of Abatement Fund at 5–6, People v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
No. 1-00-CV-788657 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2018) (estimating the average cost of
remediation at $1500–$3000 per house).
79. Encapsulants: A Technique to Control Lead Paint Hazards, N.Y. ST. DEP’T HEALTH
(Mar. 2018), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/lead/renovation_repair_painting/
encapsulants.htm [https://perma.cc/K2ZN-WB8B].
80. See City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 118 (Mo. 2007)
(Wolff, C.J., dissenting); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 511–12 (N.J. 2007) (Zazzali,
C.J., dissenting).
81. Gifford, supra note 12, at 741.
82. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1004
(1966).
83. See DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 98
(2006); see also Prosser, supra note 82, at 997.
84. IBBETSON, supra note 83, at 99–101.
85. See id. at 1–2, 101.
86. See Prosser, supra note 82, at 997.
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what were once considered criminal nuisances.87 Private nuisance was
primarily concerned with protecting the property rights of an individual
whereas public nuisance concerned behavior that was of an “antisocial”
nature.88
American jurisdictions have provided some clarity to the doctrine by
introducing a number of necessary elements to both private and public
nuisance.89 The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines public nuisance as
“an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”90
Private nuisance, on the other hand, is “a nontrespassory invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”91 A key
distinction, therefore, is whether the right being disturbed belongs
collectively to the community, or instead to an individual alone. Only those
whose rights are infringed by the nuisance may sue under the private
nuisance doctrine.92 However, as a public right belongs to the community,
either an individual alone, an individual representing the general public, or
the sovereign itself may bring suit.93 An individual can seek abatement of
the nuisance but must demonstrate a harm greater than the rest of the
community to recover damages.94 A sovereign may only seek an abatement
of the nuisance and not damages.95 In these latter situations, however, the
line between “abatement” and “damages” can become hotly contested.96
While these distinctions help to establish the boundary between public and
private nuisances, defining a nuisance remains an ambiguous task. As one
treatise notes, “[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire
law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’ It has meant all things to
all people . . . from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in pie.”97
Indeed, the rise of public nuisance claims in the context of mass tort litigation
is inextricably linked with the tort’s amorphous boundaries.98 Whether
defined by statute or case law, nuisance at common law and today is difficult
to refine beyond the Latin maxim at its English roots: “Sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas—‘So use your own property as not to injure
another’s.’”99
The difficulty of defining a “public right,” which is of course a necessary
element of a public nuisance claim, further complicates the act of defining a
87. See IBBETSON, supra note 83, at 99–101, 106.
88. Id. at 106.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
90. Id. § 821B.
91. Id. § 821D.
92. Id. § 821E.
93. Id. § 821C(2).
94. Id. § 821C(1).
95. Id. § 821C(2).
96. See, e.g., People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 568 (Ct. App.
2017) (explaining that the $1.15 billion judgment constituted an abatement fund and not
traditional damages).
97. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984).
98. See Gifford, supra note 12, at 743.
99. IBBETSON, supra note 83, at 106.
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public nuisance.100 The Restatement identifies five categories of public
rights: public health, safety, peace, comfort, and convenience.101 It further
explains that “[a] public right is one common to all members of the general
public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone
has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.”102
The categories offered in the Restatement, however, offer only the broadest
boundaries of what specifically can constitute a public right. Certain
common rights, such as the rights to clean air and navigable waterways and
roadways, are indisputable.103
However, the task of defining a common right becomes more difficult
when applying the concept to a situation not foreseen by the common law.
For example, lead paint is an indisputable health hazard, especially to
children.104
Its pervasive presence in residential homes is also
uncontested.105 One could logically conclude that a major health risk,
present throughout a substantial portion of the community, is an issue of
public health, and that as such, homes free of lead paint should be seen as a
“public right.” Yet, as explored in Part II, most state courts are unwilling to
codify this right without clear statutory guidance.106 This twofold difficulty
in both defining what constitutes a common right for a public nuisance claim
and what qualifies as a nuisance of either kind led one state supreme court to
describe nuisance as a tort that “elude[s] precise definition.”107
2. Traditional Public Nuisance Claims
Public nuisances were initially considered crimes against the crown.108
This is perhaps because the doctrine was first employed in suits to protect
property that was used by all but owned by the monarch, such as the king’s
highways, or because of the fear that a public nuisance could easily lead to a
disturbance of the peace, including by those who would seek to rectify the
nuisance without the assistance of the law.109 The first statute known to
address public nuisances, enacted in 1389, stated, “If anyone cast dung etc.
into Ditches, Water etc. which are next to any City, Borough or Town, he
who will may sue forth a writ directed unto the Mayor or Sheriff or Bayliff
of such Town etc.”110 The City of London similarly prohibited acts such as
burning improper fuels, putting waste in the streets, and maintaining animals
to the irritation of others.111 Other examples of public nuisances included
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
101. Id. § 821B(2)(a).
102. Id. § 821B cmt. g.
103. See id.
104. See supra Part I.A.
105. See supra Part I.A.
106. See discussion infra Part II.
107. City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 164 (Ill. 1982).
108. Prosser, supra note 82, at 998.
109. William A. McRae, Jr., The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1
U. FLA. L. REV. 27, 28, 33, 36 (1948).
110. Id. at 35.
111. IBBETSON, supra note 83, at 101.
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lotteries, “smoke from a lime-pit,” interfering with a market, diverting water
from a mill, and even “unlicensed stage-plays.”112 With the exception of the
plays and lotteries, such actions almost certainly would be considered public
nuisances in most American jurisdictions today.113
Most states have adopted statutes defining public nuisances and providing
a cause of action for those affected.114 These statutes largely mirror concepts
of public nuisance as developed at English common law. California, for
example, codified a public nuisance right of action in its civil code in 1872.115
The statute defines nuisance as “[a]nything which is injurious to health,
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is
indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property.”116 A public nuisance specifically is something that “affects at the
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted
upon individuals may be unequal.”117 The statutes of other states are very
similar in that they sketch the boundaries of public nuisance broadly.118
In addition to these general definitions of nuisance, some states have gone
one step further in declaring certain specific conditions, actions, or harms as
public nuisances.119 Most of these statutes reflect the traditional conceptions
of the tort, for example, by declaring whorehouses,120 obstructions to public
paths,121 and the locations of illicit drug distribution to be public
nuisances.122 This statutory approach of broadly defining public nuisance
and perhaps deeming certain specific conditions as public nuisances is a
reflection of the tort’s evolution in American jurisprudence, as it has come to
be used as a means of rectifying both harms considered proactively as well
as those not specifically proscribed but nonetheless in need of abatement.123
Until the 1970s, public nuisance claims brought under either the common
law or broad nuisance statutes in American courts largely mirrored situations
considered by the English centuries ago. For example, in 1899, a New York
appellate court ruled in favor of a plaintiff who brought a public nuisance
claim seeking damages for injuries sustained to his wagon that occurred as a
112. Prosser, supra note 82, at 998.
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
114. See id. § 821 cmt. c.
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2019).
116. Id. § 3479.
117. Id. § 3480.
118. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.74 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-111 (2019).
119. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-13-301 to 16-13-306 (2019) (providing an example
of a statute with precise definitions and classes of public nuisance).
120. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/1 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-1-1 (LexisNexis
2019).
121. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2917(A)(2) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1
(2019).
122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-343(c)(4) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7102(a)(3) (2019).
123. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 546 (2006).
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result of the defendant leaving logs in a road for at least five days.124 The
court explained that obstructing a public highway was an obvious public
nuisance and that the failure of the defendant to mitigate the problem in a
reasonable period of time made him liable to anyone “suffering special
damage.”125 This case is a perfect example of the ability of private citizens
to bring public nuisance actions and seek damages when they suffer a harm
greater than the rest of the community126 and reflects the origins of the public
nuisance doctrine.127
More common than an individual bringing a public nuisance claim,
however, is when a public entity brings suit to abate a nuisance. In 1903, for
example, Yuba County, California sued Kate Hayes Mining Company
seeking to enjoin the defendant from continuing to dump minerals from its
mine into a local creek and river.128 The county prevailed at trial by proving
that mineral deposits were collecting and causing the water beds to rise,
thereby making flooding more frequent and more destructive.129 The
California Supreme Court affirmed the injunction, finding that the
defendant’s conduct clearly constituted a public nuisance as it placed a
substantial amount of property at risk of ruin should the dumping continue
unabated.130
Communities have also used public nuisance claims to abate activities in
breach of the public’s contemporary standards of decency and morality. In
1947, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to prohibit
the Ha Ha Club, a local night club, from continuing performances that were
allegedly conducted in a “nasty, suggestive and indecent manner.”131 The
club’s performances included acts by men impersonating women, as well as
skits and jokes that were “lewd, indecent, [and] obscene.”132 The Florida
Supreme Court took the opportunity to wax poetic about the value of the
public nuisance doctrine: “There is no greater impediment to mass virtue than
a ration of filth . . . . This is the theory on which laws for the abatement of
nuisances of this kind are promulgated and enforced.”133 The court had no
difficulty finding that the salacious activity breached the community’s
standards of morality, and as such, constituted a public nuisance that was
proper for abatement.134
The three cases above are typical of public nuisance claims historically
brought in the United States.135 Each involved the infringement of a
cognizable common right, whether that of public convenience, public safety,
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See generally Lawton v. Olmstead, 58 N.Y.S. 36 (App. Div. 1899).
Id. at 37.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
See Prosser, supra note 82, at 998.
Yuba County v. Kate Hayes Mining Co., 74 P. 1049, 1050 (Cal. 1903).
Id.
Id.
Fed. Amusement Co. v. State ex rel. Tuppen, 32 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1947).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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or public morals. A clear link from the nuisance to the harm suffered
provided relief in the form of damages or abatement, the latter of which was
limited to mitigating an obvious harm in a specific location. The relative
simplicity of these traditional public nuisance suits would disappear as public
entities began to employ the theory in new contexts nearly fifty years ago.136
Harms were not as clear and took longer to manifest,137 narrow geographic
boundaries became a secondary issue,138 and the key question of whether a
public right even existed became hotly contested.139
C. Public Nuisance in Mass Torts
The tort of public nuisance has awakened from a centuries-long slumber.
Traditionally regarded as “a species of catch-all low grade criminal
offense” and as part of “the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law,” public
nuisance has emerged during the past several years as a conspicuous
weapon—albeit with inconsistent results—in the arsenal of states and
municipalities.140

Until only a few decades ago, American public nuisance cases reflected
those found historically in English common law. However, in the 1970s and
’80s, plaintiffs’ attorneys began to push the traditional boundaries of
nuisance, as the tort was vaguely defined and provided a means of avoiding
potentially fatal shortcomings of other torts, such as statutes of limitations
and the inability to recover for purely economic losses.141 While the results
of this strategy were mixed, the use of public nuisance doctrine in mass torts
is unlikely to cease anytime soon.142 Whether as a means of addressing the
opioid crisis,143 gun violence, or the hazards of lead paint, states and
communities have come to view public nuisance as an avenue of resolving
serious social health and safety issues.144

136. See Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, J. TORT L., Oct. 2011, at ii, 1.
137. See Gifford, supra note 12, at 754–55 (discussing early suits against the tobacco
industry when the harms of smoking were not yet known); see also City of Chicago v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that lead paint becomes
dangerous only once it begins to deteriorate).
138. See Merrill, supra note 136, at 1–2 (discussing attempts to employ public nuisance in
global warming litigation); see also, e.g., California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA,
2018 WL 1064293, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (highlighting the reliance by San
Francisco and Oakland on the ConAgra decision in their ongoing global warming public
nuisance suit against oil companies).
139. Compare People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 552 (Ct. App.
2017) (finding that the public holds a common right to be free of lead paint in their private
residences), with State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008) (“Absent from the
state’s complaint is any allegation that defendants have interfered with a public right as that
term long has been understood in the law of public nuisance.”).
140. Gifford, supra note 12, at 743 (quoting Prosser, supra note 82, at 999).
141. Id. at 749; Merrill, supra note 136, at 1–2.
142. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce, supra note 22, at 13–14.
143. See Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark
Opioid Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/
oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html [https://perma.cc/5TET-UBHY].
144. See Gifford, supra note 12, at 835–36.
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One of the earliest mass harm public nuisance suits was lodged by a single
plaintiff who sought to represent more than seven million citizens of Los
Angeles County against hundreds of defendants allegedly emitting harmful
pollutants into the atmosphere.145 In affirming the dismissal of the case in
1971, the California appellate court noted that “[t]he plaintiff has paid the
court an extravagant compliment in asking it to supersede the legislative and
administrative regulation in this critical area, but the trial judge showed the
greater wisdom in declining the tender.”146 The case is an outlier in that it
attempted to solve a massive social problem and was lodged by an individual,
not a public entity.147 More common in this early stage of the development
of modern public nuisance law were attempts by communities to recover
from asbestos manufacturers the costs associated with removing the harmful
product from schools and other public facilities.148 These cases, too, were
unsuccessful, often because the court was unwilling to allow the plaintiffs to
use nuisance as an end run around products liability law.149
Tobacco litigation took a slightly different path in that public nuisance
claims brought by states evolved as the product of decades of unsuccessful
suits by individuals.150 In 1994, the attorney general of Mississippi filed an
action against the tobacco industry that included a public nuisance claim.151
Within three years, forty other states filed similar cases, many of which
included the novel theory of public nuisance.152 It is by no means clear that
these claims would have succeeded at trial. Seeking to avoid potentially
devastating judgments, the tobacco industry instead settled with the states to
the tune of $206 billion.153 Thus, while never adjudicated, the tobacco
litigation was nevertheless a “formative period” for the public nuisance
doctrine, as public entities came to understand the broad scope of the tort and
its potential power over massive industries in combating serious public
policy issues.154
Since the settlement with the tobacco industry, cities and states have
lodged public nuisance claims against a variety of other industries that have
somehow contributed to mass public harm.155 These include suits against
gun manufacturers for their role in America’s endemic gun violence,156 oil

145. Diamond v. Gen. Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1971).
146. Id. at 646.
147. Gifford, supra note 12, at 750.
148. Id. at 750–52.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 753–56.
151. Id. at 759.
152. Id. at 759–60.
153. See id. at 759–60, 762.
154. Id. at 764–65 (quoting David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the
Governmental Handgun Cases, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1172–73 (2000)).
155. See Merrill, supra note 136, at 2.
156. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D.
Pa. 2000), aff’d, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2003); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821
N.E.2d 1099, 1105 (Ill. 2004); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136,
1140 (Ohio 2002).
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companies for their contributions to global warming,157 and pharmaceutical
companies for their role in the opioid crisis.158 The first major trial in this
latter context recently resulted in a judgment against Johnson & Johnson for
$572 million.159 And for the past two decades, local and state governments
have filed major public nuisance suits against lead paint manufacturers in six
different states. The respective state courts have employed different
approaches to adjudicate these cases, particularly on the existence of a
common right, that expectedly has led to unequal results.160
II. A COMMON RIGHT TO LIVE IN LEAD-FREE HOMES?
State courts have had difficulty defining the boundaries of public nuisance
in new contexts,161 which has unsurprisingly led to “strikingly inconsistent
conclusions” across the country when novel public nuisance claims arise.162
Those inconsistencies are apparent both on the issue of whether the presence
of lead-based paint in private residences infringes upon a common right and
on the method by which respective courts have answered that question.163
Part II.A discusses federal and state legislative attempts to mitigate the harms
of lead paint. Part II.B reviews those state courts that avoided answering the
question of whether a public right existed because of the plaintiffs’ inability
to satisfy the causation element of the claim. Part II.C analyzes the disparate
decisions of courts that adjudicated claims primarily by relying on the
common law and broad statutory definitions of nuisance. Finally, Part II.D
discusses a single case wherein the court relied heavily on a specific state
lead paint statute to resolve the issue.
A. Federal and State Efforts to Mitigate
Recognizing the serious risks to public health posed by lead poisoning, the
federal government and most state governments have passed legislation
seeking to combat the presence of lead paint in American homes. Congress
passed the first federal legislation, the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning
Prevention Act164 (LBPPPA) in 1971 and expanded it two decades later with
passage of the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of

157. See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 2012); City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27,
2018).
158. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-cv-02804, 2018 WL
6628898, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2018); Mayor of Baltimore v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No.
GLR-18-800, 2018 WL 1963816, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 25, 2018).
159. See Hoffman, supra note 143.
160. See infra Parts II.B–D.
161. See Gifford, supra note 12, at 747–48.
162. Id. at 748.
163. See infra Parts II.B–D.
164. Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
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1992165 (RLPHRA). The LBPPPA provided grants to study the effects of
lead exposure from a variety of sources, including paint, and also directed
the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
promulgate regulations to mitigate the harms of lead paint in federal
housing.166 Only a few years later, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, convinced of the serious harms of lead-based paint, banned the
product, effective February 1978.167 The RLPHRA further shifted the
federal government’s policy from mitigation to elimination of lead paint
hazards168 by directing multiple agencies to develop comprehensive plans for
greater public awareness. Efforts included mandatory disclosures during
sales of houses with lead paint, better inspection and risk assessment
programs, and abatement plans for eradicating lead paint.169
Following the example set by the federal government, nearly every state
passed legislation aimed at combating the serious risks of lead.170 When
New Jersey’s legislature passed its Lead Paint Act, it noted that lead
poisoning was “the most prevalent environmental health problem facing
children in [the state].”171 Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted
in its public nuisance opinion that the state’s capital is pejoratively
nicknamed “‘the lead paint capital’ because of its disproportionately large
number” of childhood lead cases.172 Most states,173 including all of those
whose courts have adjudicated lead paint public nuisance claims,174 require
that when a proper public entity, such as the local health department, finds
hazardous lead conditions on a property, its owner is responsible for abating
the risks.175 However, the courts of these states have varied in how great an
165. Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. X, 106 Stat. 3897 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
166. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 491 (N.J. 2007).
167. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing LeadContaining Paint, 16 C.F.R. § 1303 (2019).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 4851a (2012).
169. Id. §§ 4852b–4852d.
170. See Lead Hazards Project, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 29, 2017), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/lead-hazards-project.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QG48-KFNF] (compiling lead paint statutes from forty-four states and the
District of Columbia).
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Q-1 (West 2019).
172. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008).
173. Lead Hazards Project, supra note 170.
174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 105256 (West 2019); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/9
(2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 701.308 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-8 (West 2019); 23 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6-23 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 254.166 (2019).
175. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/9 (2019) (“(1) If the inspection report identifies a
lead hazard, the Department or delegate agency shall serve a mitigation notice on the property
owner that the owner is required to mitigate the lead hazard, and shall indicate the time period
specified in this Section in which the owner must complete the mitigation. The notice shall
include information describing mitigation activities which meet the requirements of this Act.
(2) If the inspection report identifies a lead hazard, the owner shall mitigate the lead hazard in
a manner prescribed by the Department and within the time limit prescribed by this Section.”);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-8 (West 2019) (“When the board of health having primary
jurisdiction hereunder finds that there is a lead-based paint hazard on the interior walls,
ceilings, doors, floors, baseboards or window sills and frames of any dwelling or any exterior
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emphasis they place on these statutes with respect to lead paint compared to
general statutes defining public nuisance and the common law of nuisance.176
B. Skirting the Difficult Question
Courts in two states avoided clarifying the threshold issue of whether lead
paint in homes interferes with a common right by instead finding that the
plaintiffs failed on the element of causation. Part II.B.1 discusses two cases
from Illinois and Part II.B.2 reviews the single lead paint public nuisance suit
from Missouri.
1. Illinois
In the early 2000s, appellate courts in Illinois reviewed two cases
involving public nuisance claims against lead paint manufacturers and trade
associations.177 In the first action, Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass’n,178 three
plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all children in the state exposed to
lead paint for damages arising from “the costs of all medical screenings,
assessments, and monitoring.”179 In the second, City of Chicago v. American
Cyanamid Co.,180 the state’s largest city brought suit as a public entity
seeking abatement of the pervasive lead paint in its homes.181 In both
instances, the trial court dismissed the case at the pleadings stage and the
appellate court affirmed.182 On the narrow issue of the existence of a
common right, the courts took slightly different approaches to reach the same
conclusion.183
In the putative class action, the appellate court simply recognized that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the existence of a public right.184
Specifically, it accepted without any analysis the allegation that the
promotion, manufacturing, and distribution of lead-based paint “exposed all
children in [the] state to the risk of lead poisoning,” thus infringing on the
common rights of public health and safety, two of the five categories of
common rights highlighted by the Restatement.185 However, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the public nuisance claim because the plaintiffs

surface that is readily accessible to children and further finds a person occupying or using such
dwelling is an unequivocal case of lead poisoning or at high risk of lead intoxication as defined
by department regulation it shall at once notify the owner that he is maintaining a public
nuisance and order him to remediate the nuisance . . . .”).
176. See infra Parts II.B–D.
177. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Lewis v.
Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
178. 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
179. Id. at 871.
180. 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
181. Id. at 128–29.
182. Id. at 128; Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 875.
183. See Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 131–32; Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 877–78.
184. Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 878.
185. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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failed to identify the specific defendants who caused the distinct harm to each
plaintiff—a critical requirement for the causation element of the claim.186
The fact that the court did not challenge the existence of a common right,
and specifically affixed it to categories discussed in the Restatement, may
have seemed promising to future plaintiffs, with the important caveat that the
case was only in the pleadings stage.187 Only two years later, another
division of the same appellate district reviewed the City of Chicago’s
nuisance claim against lead paint manufacturers.188 This time, however, the
court would offer more on the issue of common rights given that, in the
interim, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued a major ruling in another
public nuisance case. In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,189 the city,
again as plaintiff, filed a nuisance claim against gun manufacturers for their
contributions to the city’s pervasive violence.190 The Illinois Supreme Court
began by declaring the elements required of a public nuisance claim: (1) a
public right, (2) a substantial and unreasonable interference of that right, (3)
proximately caused by the defendant, and (4) which inflicted injury.191 As
to the critical threshold issue of what constitutes a common right, the court
accepted the Restatement’s broad categories.192 However, while the court
acknowledged that the public has a general right to safety and peace, relying
on the state’s precedent in nuisance cases, it was unwilling to recognize that
gun manufacturers had infringed on that right by lawfully selling weapons.193
In carefully crafting the definition of the asserted common right in
controversy, the court was “reluctant to state that there is a public right to be
free from the threat that some individuals may use an otherwise legal
product . . . in a manner that may create a risk of harm to another.”194
Undergirding its decision was a policy concern that such recognition would
constitute an “unprecedented expansion of the concept of public rights,” a
common retort among courts in lead paint nuisance claims.195
Instead of simply accepting the plaintiff’s allegation that a public right
existed, the appellate court, hearing Chicago’s appeal in American Cyanamid
Co., engaged in a more searching inquiry.196 Relying on the Restatement,
state law precedent, and Beretta, the court doubted whether the plaintiff
sufficiently pled this first critical element.197 While it acknowledged that
public nuisances can be present on multiple private properties, it seemed to
186. Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 878.
187. Id. at 871.
188. See generally Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126.
189. 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004).
190. Id. at 1105–06.
191. Id. at 1113.
192. See id. at 1114 (recognizing rights common to the public to include “the rights of
public health, public safety, public peace, public comfort, and public convenience”).
193. Id. at 1114–16.
194. Id. at 1116.
195. See id.; see also infra Parts II.C.2–D.
196. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131–32 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005).
197. Id. at 132.
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accept the defendants’ argument that lead paint only becomes a hazard when
it deteriorates—a condition within the control of individual property owners
and therefore outside of the scope of traditional public rights such as
highways, waterways, and clean air.198
Nevertheless, the court avoided definitively ruling on the common right
issue.199 Instead, it assumed the existence of a public right and affirmed the
lower court’s dismissal given that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege
factual causation.200 As in Lewis, the plaintiff’s inability to satisfy traditional
but-for causation was fatal.201 Importantly, the court also declined the city’s
attempts to overcome this hurdle by accepting an alternative approach to
causation, such as market share liability.202
While the Illinois courts have not ruled authoritatively on whether lead
paint in homes infringes upon a public right, there is clearly skepticism,
especially following the state supreme court’s decision in Beretta.203 More
important, however, is the process by which the two courts approached the
issue. In each instance, the courts relied almost exclusively on the
Restatement and state precedent.204 Interestingly, neither court looked to
Illinois’ Lead Poisoning Prevention Act205 or its public nuisance statute206 to
guide its analysis.207 Instead, both courts skirted the issue by focusing on the
element of factual causation and concluding that the plaintiffs could not
succeed under the state’s traditional but-for standard.208
2. Missouri
In January 2000, the City of St. Louis filed an action against numerous
lead paint manufacturers asserting eight tort claims, including one for public
nuisance.209 The city alleged that it was among the top ten U.S. cities in
number of children suffering from elevated blood levels and that the problem
persisted because more than 90 percent of all homes in the city were
constructed prior to the federal government’s ban on lead paint.210 The city

198. See id. at 132–33.
199. Id. at 133.
200. Id.
201. See id.; Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
202. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 134.
203. Id. at 132–33.
204. Id. at 130–33; Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 877–78.
205. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 to 45/17 (2019).
206. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/47-5 (2019).
207. Both courts cited a single provision of the statute, but only to note that the plaintiffs
cited it in their respective arguments. See Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 132; Lewis, 793
N.E.2d at 874–75. At the end of its opinion in American Cyanamid Co., the court also
mentioned that property owners are required by law to remediate deteriorated lead paint;
however, this did not factor into its analysis of whether a public right exists. See Am. Cyanamid
Co., 823 N.E.2d at 139.
208. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 139–40; Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 878–79.
209. Brief of Appellants at 11, City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d
110 (Mo. 2007) (No. ED87702), 2006 WL 2029789, at *11.
210. Id. at *10–11.
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sought compensation for previous and future abatement efforts.211 After the
trial court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion, the city
appealed.212
The Missouri Supreme Court narrowly rejected the public nuisance claim
by a 4-3 vote.213 As with the Illinois appellate courts in Lewis and American
Cyanamid Co., the court found that the city failed to allege sufficient facts to
satisfy actual causation.214 Relying heavily on one of its decisions from the
mid-1980s215 in which it rejected alternative standards of actual causation for
products liability claims arising out of the use of diethylstilbestrol (DES), the
majority took the opportunity to reemphasize that Missouri would not adopt
a more malleable causation standard as proposed by the city and as adopted
by jurisdictions like California.216
The court’s focus on causation muddled the answer as to whether it
believed a public right existed in the first place.217 The majority’s only
substantive discussion of public nuisance doctrine was to note that the city’s
claim actually appeared to be a private tort action seeking recovery for
cleanup costs.218 As noted earlier, while private parties may recover
damages through a public nuisance action, public entities may only seek
abatement.219 However, aside from this distinction, the majority did not
discuss the public nuisance doctrine any further.220 As with the courts in
Illinois, it looked neither to the state’s Lead Abatement and Prevention of
Lead Poisoning Act221 nor its public nuisance statutes222 to aid its analysis.
The simple fact that the city could not satisfy traditional but-for causation
allowed the court to avoid the deeper questions about public nuisance and
common rights.223
Three justices of the Missouri Supreme Court dissented.224 Chief Justice
Michael Wolff, who authored the dissenting opinion, argued that requiring
211. Id. at *9–10.
212. The appeal was first heard by the Missouri Court of Appeals and then transferred to
the Missouri Supreme Court. See City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., No. ED 87702,
2006 WL 3780785, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
213. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 117 (Mo. 2007).
214. Id. at 114; see supra Part II.B.1.
215. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984).
216. See Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 115–16 (citing Zafft, in which the Missouri
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of market share liability introduced by the California
Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980)). For an important
source of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sindell, see Naomi Sheiner, Note, DES
and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
217. See Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 113–14.
218. Id. at 116.
219. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
220. See Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 113–14.
221. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 701.300–701.349 (2019).
222. Missouri’s public nuisance statutes are scattered throughout its state code and are
generally tied to a specific type of nuisance. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 311.740 (2019)
(public nuisance law related to alcoholic beverages); MO. REV. STAT. § 579.105 (2019) (public
nuisance law related to controlled substances).
223. See Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 116–17.
224. Id. at 117 (Wolff, C.J., dissenting).
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the city to identify the specific defendant whose product was used in each
particular residence defied the purpose of the public nuisance doctrine.225
Drawing on an analogy embedded in the common law conception of public
nuisance, Wolff struggled to see how the defendants’ conduct in selling a
hazardous product that continued to inflict harm was different from a group
of defendants dumping toxic sludge into a stream.226 The community-wide
harm suffered because of the defendants’ conduct should have only required
plaintiffs to identify the lead paint manufacturers that contributed to that
harm, not to engage in a case-by-case identification of which defendants’
products were used in which homes.227 Such a high bar for causation in
public nuisance cases, Wolff feared, would transform the tort into a mass
harm class action in which members would still be required to prove
individual injury.228
Chief Justice Wolff also raised arguably the most important policy
consideration underlying the entire claim and others like it, a point largely
ignored by both the majority and the Illinois courts.229 Cities such as St.
Louis had and were continuing to expend substantial sums of money230 to
mitigate the hazard of residential lead paint, a problem that they did not
create.231 In his eyes, such a costly decision was undoubtedly worthwhile,
as cities could not “continue having the brains of many of its children
permanently dulled by lead poisoning.”232 But should cities not have an
avenue for recovering those expenditures?233 While the chief justice viewed
the judiciary, and specifically the public nuisance doctrine, as a means to

225. Id. at 117–18.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 117–19.
228. Id. at 119.
229. Id. at 116 (majority opinion) (acknowledging only the city’s remediation efforts in
“certain, albeit numerous, properties”). Neither American Cyanamid Co. nor Lewis discusses
the substantial cost borne by cities for lead remediation programs. See generally City of
Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Lewis v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
230. See, e.g., CITY OF MILWAUKEE HEALTH DEP’T, CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING
PREVENTION PROGRAM: ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 18–19 (2018), https://localtvwiti.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/mhdlead-report-1-29-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5ZF-BMYR] (demonstrating that the City of
Milwaukee has spent between $3 and $6 million per year from 2005 to 2018 on lead abatement
efforts); City of St. Louis Earns Grant to Continue Lead Remediation, OFF. MAYOR ST. LOUIS
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/mayor/news/cityearns-grant-to-continue-lead-remediation.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y2K8-WYJQ] (explaining
that the City of St. Louis spends approximately $3 million per year on lead paint remediation);
Michael Hawthorne, Lead Paint Poisons Poor Chicago Kids as City Spends Millions Less on
Cleanup, CHI. TRIB. (May 1, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-lead-poisoningchicago-met-20150501-story.html [https://perma.cc/BE8S-WTYL] (revealing that the City of
Chicago has spent between $4 million and $8 million each year in lead paint abatement
programs over the past decade).
231. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d at 118 (Wolff, C.J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. See id. at 118–19.
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provide relief, at least two other state supreme courts have explicitly rejected
such a responsibility as outside of the scope of their authority.234
C. Proceeding on the Common Law
Contrary to the approach taken by Illinois and Missouri, the courts of three
other states actually answered whether there exists a public right to be free
of lead paint in homes by relying on the common law and broad public
nuisance conceptions.235 Part II.C.1 discusses the intricate history of lead
paint cases in Wisconsin as well as the recent California judgment in
ConAgra. In both states, the plaintiffs prevailed on the existence of a public
right.236 Part II.C.2 analyzes how the Rhode Island Supreme Court found
that no public right exists and that the amorphous boundaries of public
nuisance could not replace clear legislative guidance on a major public policy
issue.237 Furthermore, it explores how the court rejected the proposition that
pervasive lead paint in private homes could constitute an infringement of a
public right as conceived in the public nuisance doctrine.238
1. Public Right Found
In a series of cases in Wisconsin and California, public entities were
successful in their arguments that lead paint in private homes infringed upon
a common right.239 In the former, the plaintiffs still ultimately failed on their
public nuisance claim,240 while, in the latter, the plaintiffs succeeded and did
so with a substantial judgment in their favor.241
a. Wisconsin
Of the six states in which public entities brought public nuisance claims
against lead paint companies, Wisconsin’s case history demonstrates the
greatest interplay between the courts and the legislature. There, plaintiffs
came close to prevailing on their public nuisance claims given that the courts
crafted a flexible definition of the tort.242 However, concerned with the
policy implications of using public nuisance doctrine in place of products
liability and negligence actions, especially against manufacturers for

234. See infra Parts II.C.2, II.D.
235. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 552 (Ct. App. 2017);
State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 447–48 (R.I. 2008); City of Milwaukee v. NL
Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 767–77 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 691
N.W.2d 888, 891–92 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
236. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552; NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d at 764 n.5.
237. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435–36.
238. Id. at 452–53.
239. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552; NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d at 764 n.5.
240. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d at 761–62.
241. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 514, 598.
242. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d at 891–92.
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decades-old, once-legal activities, the legislature stepped in to eradicate any
chance that other plaintiffs could succeed in the future.243
The litigation began in 2001 when the City of Milwaukee filed numerous
claims, including a public nuisance action, against two lead paint
manufacturers for their role in creating a public health hazard.244 The city
alleged that, in the few years preceding the filing of the case, almost 20,000
children had suffered from lead paint poisoning.245 That translated into an
average of 16 percent of children across the entire city, including 26.4 percent
in its urban areas and up to 63 percent in the most heavily impacted areas.246
The trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of the
public nuisance claim given the plaintiff’s inability to satisfy causation; the
city appealed.247
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court, finding that
there were genuine disputes of material fact.248 While most of its opinion
focused on causation, the court also defined the necessary elements of a
public nuisance claim, something which had been lacking in the state’s
jurisprudence.249 Yet, on the issue of a common right, the court offered little
guidance.250 For example, it recited a list of factors from a previous case that
could be used in evaluating whether an activity or condition constituted a
nuisance, the last of which was “the degree or character of the injury inflicted
or right impinged upon.”251 However, nowhere in the opinion did the court
explain what constituted a public right. Instead, the court held that the
general question of the existence of a public nuisance, which inherently
incorporates the existence of some public right, was one for the jury.252
On remand, the parties proceeded to trial, during which the city presented
evidence substantially similar to what would be successful years later in
ConAgra.253 The jury found in a special verdict that while the presence of
lead paint in homes across Milwaukee was a public nuisance, specifically
because of the health hazards to children, the defendants were not the legal
cause of the nuisance.254 Again, the city appealed, claiming a number of
errors in jury instructions; however, the appellate court affirmed the trial
decision.255 Given the basis of the appeal, the court again did not provide
any further clarity on the appropriateness of lead paint public nuisance claims
243. WIS. STAT. § 895.046 (2019).
244. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d at 891–92.
245. Brief of Appellant at 5, City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004) (No. 03-2786), 2003 WL 25257400, at *5.
246. Id.
247. NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d at 890.
248. Id. at 893–94.
249. Id. at 892.
250. See id. at 891–92.
251. Id. at 891.
252. See id. at 895.
253. See City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 762–67 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008);
see also People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 526–45 (Ct. App.
2017).
254. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d at 764 n.5, 767.
255. Id. at 761–62.
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nor on the more narrow issue of common rights as a necessary element of
such claims.256
At the same time that the suit by the City of Milwaukee bounced between
the trial and appellate courts, another lead paint case made its way to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. In September 1999, J. Steven Thomas, by his
guardian ad litem, filed a negligence suit against his landlords and multiple
lead paint manufacturers for serious developmental issues arising from his
ingestion of paint chips as an infant.257 However, as evidenced by the public
nuisance cases brought by St. Louis and Chicago, the inability to satisfy
traditional but-for causation was potentially fatal to his claim.258 Drawing
on the solution crafted for a parallel problem in the DES litigation of the
1980s, the Wisconsin high court decided to extend the risk contribution
theory to lead paint cases, thereby alleviating plaintiffs of the burden of
identifying specific manufacturers.259
The Wisconsin legislature, however, was displeased with the ruling,
viewing it as an “improperly expansive application of the risk contribution
theory of liability.”260 A few years after the decision, and under a new
governor, the legislature passed a law that seriously curtailed the breadth of
the risk contribution theory and eliminated it as an alternative to but-for
causation in lead paint cases.261 Among the legislature’s greatest concerns
were the social and economic consequences of imposing liability on
companies for once-legal activities undertaken decades ago,262 a common
retort among state courts that denied relief in public nuisance claims.263
Therefore, while primarily focused on the element of causation, the new law
also imposed a twenty-five-year statute of limitations for a variety of claims
against lead paint manufacturers, distributors, and promoters, including
claims for public and private nuisance.264 Given that the statute of limitations
ran from the product’s date of sale,265 and because the federal government
had banned lead paint more than twenty-five years earlier in 1978,266 the law
effectively immunized former lead paint companies from liability and
prevented any further claims against them.
The history of lead paint litigation and the legislative response in
Wisconsin offers two potential takeaways for navigating the current disparate
256. Id. at 757.
257. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 528–31 (Wis. 2005).
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d at 527.
260. WIS. STAT. § 895.046 (2019).
261. See id.; see also Timothy D. Edwards & Jessica E. Ozalp, A New Era: Products
Liability Law in Wisconsin, WIS. LAW. (July 2011), https://www.wisbar.org/
NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=84&Issue=7&ArticleID=
2050 [https://perma.cc/TBM7-JNXB].
262. WIS. STAT. § 895.046 (2019).
263. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 452–55 (R.I. 2008).
264. WIS. STAT. § 895.046 (2019).
265. Id.
266. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing LeadContaining Paint, 16 C.F.R. § 1303 (2019).
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landscape of lead paint public nuisance cases. First, one potential solution to
resolve the existence of a common right is to simply ask the jury whether a
public nuisance exists,267 as answering so affirmatively inherently requires
also finding the existence of a common right.268 This approach, however, is
uncommon, as in every other state this threshold question is one for the
court.269 It also deprives courts in public nuisance suits of their historic
“gatekeeper” role meant to ensure that the tort is not used improperly.270
Second, state legislatures can, and perhaps should, decide whether or not to
extend public nuisance doctrine to include lead paint claims.271 Legislatures
are better suited to balance costs and benefits on social issues than are
courts.272 Clear statutory guidance would also provide the judiciary greater
clarity in adjudicating claims of such an amorphous tort.273 However, while
such legislative action would be helpful, it is important to remember that
public nuisance is a valuable remedy precisely because it can be employed
to rectify harms not considered by the legislature.274
b. California
Of all the lead paint public nuisance cases across the country, in only one
did the plaintiffs succeed both on the existence of a common right and on the
overall nuisance claim.275 Initially filed in 2000, People v. ConAgra Grocery
Products Co.276 had a lengthy and complex history, with opinions at all three
levels of the California judiciary over almost two decades.277 In its final
form, the case involved ten plaintiffs, all California counties, that lodged a
single claim of public nuisance against five former manufacturers of lead
paint.278 Judge James Kleinberg of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County
presided over a bench trial that lasted for six weeks in the summer of 2013.279
On January 7, 2014, he issued a 114-page decision in which he found three
of the five companies liable for creating a public nuisance by promoting the
sale of lead-based paint and ordered them to pay $1.15 billion in abatement

267. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 764 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App.
2008).
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
269. See, e.g., People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 551–52 (Ct.
App. 2017); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 500–01 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453–54 (R.I. 2008).
270. See Part II.C.1.ii; see also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving
the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 872 (2001).
271. Merrill, supra note 136, at 4–5.
272. Id. at 32; see also Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435–36.
273. Merrill, supra note 136, at 29–30.
274. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 123, at 546.
275. See People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 514, 593–94 (Ct.
App. 2017).
276. Id. at 499.
277. Id. at 525 n.22.
278. People v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *2–3, *5
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014).
279. Id. at *1.
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funds.280 Three years later, the Sixth Appellate District largely affirmed the
ruling, although it did order a recalculation of the abatement funds;281 both
the Supreme Court of California282 and the Supreme Court of the United
States denied certiorari.283 On remand in September 2018, the trial court
reduced the total abatement payment from $1.15 billion to $409 million.284
Finally, in July 2019, the parties reached a postjudgment settlement of $305
million,285 which, while only a quarter of the original award, is not
insubstantial.
At both the trial and appellate levels, each court accepted that the public
possessed a common right to be free of lead-based paint in their homes.286
However, neither court, despite decisions of considerable length, spent much
space discussing the critical threshold issue.287 Both relied exclusively on
the state’s public nuisance statute288 to easily find that the public did indeed
possess a common right to be free of lead paint in their homes.289 The
flexible definition of a common right in the statute allowed the trial court to
characterize the public right at issue as one “to be free from the harmful
effects of lead in paint.”290 The appellate court described the common right
more broadly, adding that pervasive lead paint “threatens the public right to
essential community resources,” specifically residential housing and
associated resources “like water, electricity, natural gas, and sewer
services.”291
The tort of public nuisance is purposefully broad to protect against harms
that cannot be proscribed proactively.292 As such, the doctrine affords the
judiciary substantial discretion in adjudicating public nuisance claims,293
including the element of a common right.294 That discretion has traditionally
been tempered in American jurisprudence as courts have employed a strict
gatekeeping role.295 However, the defendants in ConAgra charged that both
the California trial and appellate courts failed to exercise that
responsibility.296 In reaching their conclusion that the public possessed a
common right to be free of lead paint in their homes, neither court looked to
280. Id. at *61–62.
281. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598.
282. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139
S. Ct. 377 (2018) (No. 18-84).
283. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct. 377 (2018) (mem.).
284. See supra note 78.
285. Press Release, James R. Williams, supra note 20.
286. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 551–52.
287. See id.; People v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *5–
6, 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014).
288. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479–3480 (West 2019).
289. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 551–52; Atl. Richfield Co., 2014 WL 1385823, at *8.
290. Atl. Richfield Co., 2014 WL 1385823, at *8.
291. ConAgra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552.
292. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 123, at 546.
293. See Antolini, supra note 270, at 773–74.
294. Id. at 771–72.
295. See id. at 776.
296. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 282, at 1–2.
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the broader history of the tort nor the traditional kinds of common rights
protected under the public nuisance doctrine.297 By relying exclusively on a
broadly worded statute, the courts found a public right not traditionally
conceived by the doctrine.298 While the public has a common right against
interference with their collective health, the lead paint was pervasive in
private homes, not public buildings or public housing, and was put there by
individual homeowners.299 The Restatement300 and numerous courts have
warned that the aggregation of individual harms cannot equate to the
interference of a common right,301 which is arguably what the California
courts found.302
Some scholars are concerned that ConAgra will invite public entities to
wield the public nuisance doctrine as a powerful weapon against
businesses.303 Already, two California cities have cited the case in their
public nuisance suit against oil companies for their contribution to global
warming.304 Even more worrisome, these scholars fear ConAgra’s broad
conception of common rights, if followed, would mean “the concept of a
public nuisance claim would be subject to no meaningful restriction and
would swallow virtually all tort law.”305 Though it is only a single case, a
recent judgment for the state of Oklahoma against Johnson & Johnson for its
role in the opioid crisis lends some credence to these warnings.306
For their part, the plaintiffs in ConAgra argued that these concerns are
unfounded.307 First, they argue that the case will not promote a flood of new
litigation, as the underlying basis for the decision was laid in 2006 and there
had been no spike in public nuisance suits since.308 Second, while they
acknowledged that public nuisance is conceived broadly, especially in
California, public nuisance also has a number of safeguards to prevent it from
becoming abused, primarily that suits are brought by politically accountable
officials who can only seek equitable abatement, not damages.309 Though
diametrically opposed in their predictions, neither the plaintiffs nor the

297. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 551–52 (Ct. App.
2017); People v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *8 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014).
298. Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–
8, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct. 377 (2018) (No. 18-84) [hereinafter
Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars].
299. Id. at 8.
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
301. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115–16 (Ill.
2004); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 448 (R.I. 2008).
302. See Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 7–8.
303. Id. at 21.
304. California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 n.2 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
305. Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 7–8.
306. See Hoffman, supra note 143.
307. Brief in Opposition at 34–38, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct.
377 (2018) (No. 18-84).
308. Id. at 35.
309. Id. at 36–37.
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scholars are clairvoyants; the reality of a new legal landscape will likely not
become apparent until more time has passed.
2. No Public Right Found (Rhode Island)
In 1999, the attorney general of Rhode Island initiated a public nuisance
suit against multiple former lead paint manufacturers and a trade association
that once promoted the product.310 Seven years later, State v. Lead Industries
Ass’n311 finally went to trial.312 In what would become the longest civil trial
in the state’s history, the jury returned a verdict for the state.313 Two years
thereafter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the judgment on a
number of grounds, including in its finding that there is no common right of
the public to live in lead-free homes.314
Unlike other courts, the Rhode Island Supreme Court began with an
expansive history of public nuisance and its origins in the English common
law315 and its evolution in the state’s jurisprudence.316 Recognizing that the
common law must reflect societal changes, the court warned of revolutionary
measures that would destroy carefully crafted legal principles.317 Instead,
the law should evolve “gradually and incrementally and usually in a direction
that can be predicted.”318 With those cautionary words, the court then
analyzed the elements of public nuisance claims under Rhode Island law.319
On the threshold element of a public right, which it identified as the sine
qua non of any public nuisance suit,320 the court reflected the same
skepticism as the Illinois Supreme Court in Beretta.321 Individualized harms
in the aggregate cannot equate to the infringement of a common right as
traditionally conceived under the public nuisance doctrine.322 While mass
injuries, like those arising from lead paint, affect a large number of
individuals, public rights are more than simply the total of private harms.323
Instead, they are “indivisible” and shared by the entirety of society.324
Therefore, the state’s argument that lead paint interfered with the health of
310. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 434 (R.I. 2008).
311. 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008).
312. Id. at 434.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 453–54.
315. Id. at 443–44.
316. Id. at 445–46.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 445.
319. Id. at 447–57. Rhode Island adds a control element to its public nuisance claims. The
defendants must have “control over the instrumentality alleged to have created the nuisance
when the damage occurred.” Id. at 446. Such a requirement means that nuisance claims can
almost never be brought against a defendant for a harmful product. See Schwartz & Goldberg,
supra note 123, at 567–68.
320. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 447.
321. See id. at 447–48, 454–55; see also City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821
N.E.2d 1099, 1114–16 (Ill. 2004).
322. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 448.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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the general public, while factually true, was not legally sufficient for the
purpose of a public nuisance claim.325 Citing the Restatement and nuisance
cases from across the country, the court reflected a conception of public
rights that mirrored that of its English common law origins.326 To hold that
lead paint infringed upon some common right would be to create a right
where none exists and, more concerning, would create a precedent that any
mass harm could fall under the public nuisance doctrine.327 As no common
right existed, the court held that the trial judge should have dismissed the suit
from the outset.328 Of all the courts to adjudicate lead paint public nuisance
claims, this focus on the critical threshold issue of the existence of a common
right was arguably the most faithful to the common law and the most efficient
approach in evaluating the novel claims.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was conscientious throughout its opinion
in repeatedly tempering expectations about the role of the judiciary in
tackling social issues.329 While entirely sympathetic to the grave health
problems still inflicted by lead paint,330 the court would not allow public
nuisance to be stretched in such a manner as to upend the tort itself.331 Doing
so, the justices feared, “would be antithetical to the common law and would
lead to a widespread expansion of public nuisance law that never was
intended.”332 In the array of remedies available to both private citizens and
public entities, the body of tort law requires that distinct torts remain separate
and not subsume one another.333 To allow recovery, the court cautioned,
would mean the creation of bad laws,334 something, it noted, Edmund Burke
once warned constituted “the worst sort of tyranny.”335
D. Adjudicating Claims with Legislative Guidance (New Jersey)
Of all the lead paint cases brought under a public nuisance theory, the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in In re Lead Paint Litigation336 relied
most heavily on the actions the state legislature had already taken to address
the problem. The litigation began in 2001 when the City of Newark sued
325. Id. at 453.
326. Id. at 448 (“Rather, a public right is the right to a public good, such as ‘an indivisible
resource shared by the public at large, like air, water, or public rights of way.’” (quoting City
of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)); see also supra
Part I.B.
327. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 454.
328. Id. at 453.
329. See id. at 435–36, 445–46, 480–81.
330. Id. at 435.
331. Id. at 453–54 (“The enormous leap that the state urges us to take is wholly inconsistent
with the widely recognized principle that the evolution of the common law should occur
gradually, predictably, and incrementally. Were we to hold otherwise, we would change the
meaning of public right to encompass all behavior that causes a widespread interference with
the private rights of numerous individuals.”).
332. Id. at 453.
333. See id. at 445–57; see also Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 123, at 579–80.
334. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 480–81.
335. Id. at 454.
336. 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007).
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multiple lead paint manufacturers on a variety of claims ranging from fraud
and civil conspiracy to public nuisance.337 Twenty-five other cities, towns,
and boroughs across the state brought their own similar suits shortly
thereafter.338 A single transferee judge assigned to manage all of the cases
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting the plaintiffs’
“proverbial Gordian Knot” of claims and characterizing their nuisance theory
as being contrary to the state’s statutes, constitution, and precedent.339 The
appellate court reversed and remanded the public nuisance claims, finding
that the trial judge erred in concluding that the state’s lead paint statute
precluded the communities from bringing a public nuisance claim against the
defendants.340 Indeed, the court found that litigation may actually foster the
same objectives as those pronounced by the legislature in providing another
mechanism to abate lead paint in residences.341 The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted review explicitly to resolve uncertainties surrounding public
nuisance actions.342
Similar to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,343 the New Jersey Supreme
Court began by providing general background information on the theory of
public nuisance and pronounced broad boundaries of the tort that mirrored
those of the Restatement.344 The court then turned to one of the most
contentious issues in the litigation: whether a state statute precluded,
encouraged, or had no effect on the right of public entities to bring public
nuisance suits.345 Specifically, the New Jersey legislature declared that lead
paint in a hazardous state inside private homes constituted a public
nuisance.346 While the court expressed doubts about whether the
legislature’s use of the term “public nuisance” meant that it also implied a
common right against residential lead paint,347 it was clear that the legislature
had already decided that abatement was the responsibility of individual
homeowners.348 Further, the statute developed a comprehensive program to
abate and eradicate lead paint from residences through the use of grants and
low-interest loans funded, in part, by sales taxes on paint products.349 The
337. Id. at 486–87.
338. Id.
339. In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L-2754-01, 2002 WL 31474528, at *1, *23 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Nov. 4, 2002).
340. In re Lead Paint Litig., No. A-1946-02T3, 2005 WL 1994172, at *5–6, *21 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 17, 2005).
341. See id. at *5–6.
342. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 489.
343. See supra Part II.C.
344. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 499; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 821B, 821C (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
345. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 499–502.
346. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-5 (West 2019) (“The presence of lead paint upon the
interior of any dwelling or upon any exterior surface that is readily accessible to children
causing a hazard to the occupants or anyone coming in contact with such surfaces is hereby
declared to be a public nuisance.”).
347. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 501.
348. Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-8 (West 2019).
349. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 493–94.
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plaintiffs argued that the legislative actions did not preclude a public nuisance
claim.350 However, the majority, in a split decision, saw these efforts as
dispositive.351 In engaging in the inherently legislative function of allocating
costs and developing a holistic approach to a serious social problem, the court
remarked that the legislature did not intend “to sanction a tort-based theory
of recovery.”352
Even in the absence of such legislation, the majority would have still found
that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their public nuisance claim.353 First,
the majority viewed the “abatement” sought by local communities as a mask
for damages,354 a concern similar to that of the Missouri Supreme Court.355
Second, the majority saw the true underlying claim as one rooted in products
liability, not public nuisance.356 Finally, as with the Rhode Island Supreme
Court,357 the court warned that conflating distinct torts would have disastrous
consequences for the entire body of tort law.358
Two justices disagreed with the majority’s conclusion.359 In his dissent,
Chief Justice James Zazzali argued that the legislature’s actions on the
important social problem did not preclude a public nuisance suit.360 In fact,
the statute and the lawsuit together sought to tackle “the same evil.”361 Tort
law, he argued, was the mechanism by which private citizens, including
through their elected officials, could seek corrective justice,362 and it was the
judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that it modernized with societal
changes.363 On the threshold issue of a common right, however, he offered
only that the public has a “right to be free from the harmful effects of lead
paint.”364 Like Chief Justice Wolff in Missouri,365 Chief Justice Zazzali
recognized that these lead paint public nuisance suits were truly about who
should bear the costs of abatement.366 However, he did not explain further
how the toxin in private homes violated some common right held by the
public as a whole.367
350. Id. at 499.
351. See id. at 500.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 500–02.
354. Id. at 502.
355. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo. 2007).
356. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 503.
357. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 456–57 (R.I. 2008).
358. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 505.
359. Id. at 506, 512 (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 508.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 511.
363. Id. at 506.
364. Id.
365. City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 118–19 (Mo. 2007)
(Wolff, C.J., dissenting).
366. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 511 (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting) (“The only
impediment to purging New Jersey of lead paint is the financial cost. The majority’s holding
unfairly places the cost of abatement on taxpayers and private property owners, while
sheltering those responsible for creating the problem.”).
367. Id. at 506–12.
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The majority in In re Lead Paint Litigation shared the fears of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.368 While sympathetic to the harms stemming from
lead paint, it was concerned that allowing the public nuisance claim to
proceed would “stretch the concept of public nuisance far beyond recognition
and would create a new and entirely unbounded tort antithetical to the
meaning and inherent theoretical limitations of the tort.”369 And given its
emphasis on acts by the state legislature to address the problem, of all the
courts to adjudicate lead paint nuisance claims, it was most leery of the
judiciary overstepping its boundaries.370
III. AVOIDING THE CONAGRA APPROACH TO PUBLIC NUISANCE
As the New Jersey chief justice explained in his dissent, lead paint public
nuisance litigation is fundamentally about who should bear the costs of
mitigating the serious health hazards of pervasive lead paint—manufacturers,
or homeowners and taxpayers.371 However, as the amicus brief in support of
ConAgra’s petition to the Supreme Court warned, there is great fear among
some in the legal community that stretching the traditional boundaries of the
public nuisance doctrine to allow recovery will lead to an explosion of
lawsuits that would upend the entirety of tort law.372 The polar positions in
many ways reflect the disparate analytical approaches and conclusions of the
courts in the six states which have heard such cases, particularly on the issue
of the existence of a common right.373 In adjudicating public nuisance cases
in novel contexts, courts should follow the approach of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court by carefully ensuring that the plaintiffs prove that the
supposed nuisance is infringing upon a right truly held in common by the
public.374 Part III.A argues that there is no common right to be free of lead
paint in private residences. Part III.B posits that the solution for widespread
social harms like pervasive lead paint should be the responsibility of
legislatures, not the judiciary.
A. No Public Right to Lead-Free Homes Exists
ConAgra wrongfully created a common right where none exists. Pervasive
lead paint, while harmful both individually and socially, does not infringe
upon any right held collectively by the public under the public nuisance
doctrine.375 To begin, the paint is present in private homes, not in any shared
public space.376 While the presence of lead paint constitutes a substantial
risk to the health of many individual members of the public, the aggregation
of such potential harms does not necessarily infringe upon a right held by the
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Id. at 494 (majority opinion); see supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text.
In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 494.
Id. at 505; see also supra Parts II.B–C.
See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 511 (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting).
See Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 5–8.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 7–8.
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public collectively.377 If lead particles spread outside of the home and into
the public space, as with smoke or dust, plaintiffs may then have a more
compelling argument that the paint infringed upon a common right because
the community shares a right to the air.378 Similarly, the poisoning of a well
would infringe upon a common right to water, and the blocking of a roadway
would interfere with the public’s right of convenience.379 However, absent
such a showing, pervasive lead paint contained within private homes does
not violate an indivisible public right because the public possesses no
collective right to health in their individual dwellings.380 To hold otherwise
would be to create a public right against all harms, something the tort was
never intended to do.381
As no common right exists, public nuisance claims cannot be brought to
abate residential lead paint.382 While an attractive and novel theory, the
public nuisance doctrine should not be employed in the place of other torts
simply because it is the last available option.383 Individuals can still attempt
to bring private nuisance actions on their own behalf or another tort claim
like negligence or products liability if available. Public entities should
preserve public nuisance to combat interferences with truly common rights,
not as a vehicle for restitution of the costs of mitigating a social harm that
arose from a once-legal product.384
Future state courts that adjudicate lead paint public nuisance suits should
dismiss the claims from the outset, following the analysis set forth by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.385 The lack of a common right means that
public nuisance is simply inapposite. Courts should state such a proposition
directly, contrary to Illinois and Missouri,386 as doing so will provide
structure to the often nebulous tort. Further, a trial judge should make this
determination, not a jury.387 If there is no common right, there is no public
nuisance and therefore no need to waste precious judicial resources on a trial.
The value of the public nuisance doctrine is that it can be employed to combat
social harms not considered or proscribed proactively;388 however, to
preserve that value, courts cannot allow the tort to morph into a panacea that
would swallow the carefully crafted evolution of tort law.389

377. See id. at 5–8.
378. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also
Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 8.
379. See supra Part I.B.
380. See supra Part II.C.2.
381. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 2007).
382. See supra Part II.C.2.
383. See supra Part I.C.
384. See supra Parts II.C.2–D.
385. See supra Part II.C.2.
386. See supra Part II.B.
387. See supra Part II.B.2.
388. See Gifford, supra note 12, at 745.
389. See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501–02 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 456–57 (R.I. 2008).
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B. Legislatures Are Better Suited to Tackle This Problem
Complex social issues should be resolved by legislatures, not by courts
through the public nuisance doctrine.390 Pervasive lead-based paint in
residential homes is one such issue. Nearly every state legislature has
followed the federal government in passing laws to mitigate the risks of lead
paint,391 and continued efforts at eradicating the toxin should be within their
exclusive control.392 While Chief Justice Zazzali was correct that courts
have a responsibility to modernize the common law,393 they also have a duty
to ensure that existing law is not employed impermissibly.394 To allow
recovery in public nuisance lead paint suits not only defies the boundaries of
the tort but also places the court in the role of decision maker about the
distribution costs on a major social issue, something which should be a
legislative function.395
By and large, the majority of courts that have adjudicated public nuisance
claims in the course of lead paint litigation have fulfilled their strict
gatekeeper role396 and have not allowed the tort to stray from its English
common law roots.397 Beginning with the first major public nuisance suit in
1971, which attempted to solve the problem of air pollution in Los Angeles,
through the explosion of public nuisance suits in the last two decades,398
courts have generally resisted allowing public nuisance to become a vehicle
by which to usurp the legislative branch.399 With the exception of ConAgra,
lead paint public nuisance claims have rightly failed.400 As courts face public
nuisance suits in new contexts—whether global warming, the opioid crisis,
or some unforeseen mass harm—they should recall the wisdom of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court in avoiding the siren call of public nuisance: “This
Court is bound by the law and can provide justice only to the extent that law
allows . . . . This Court is powerless to fashion independently a cause of
action that would achieve the justice that these children deserve.”401
CONCLUSION
Lead-based paint indisputably remains a significant health hazard in the
United States. Despite a federal ban on the product almost half a century
ago, hundreds of thousands of children still suffer from elevated levels of
lead in their blood and millions more continue to live under such a threat.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
36.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.D.
See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 508 (Zazzali, C.J., dissenting).
See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 443–46.
See Merrill, supra note 136, at 4–5, 32; see also Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 435–
See supra Part II.
See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 123, at 583.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.
State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008).
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Time-barred from products liability or negligence claims, numerous states
have employed the public nuisance doctrine in attempts to hold lead paint
companies liable for the persisting problem. With the exception of ConAgra
in California, all of these attempts have failed—either because the courts
refused to recognize that the actions of lead paint companies taken decades
ago interfere with a public right today or because the plaintiffs failed to
properly allege factual causation, thus allowing the courts to skirt any
decision on the existence of a public right.
Recognizing that there are undoubtedly difficulties in defining the
amorphous boundaries of a “common right” and that lead-based paint is an
unfortunate pervasive harm, the tort of public nuisance is not the proper tool
for communities to employ in their abatement efforts. As understood in the
common law and through modern American jurisprudence, lead paint in
private homes does not infringe upon any right commonly held by the public.
Absent this threshold requirement, public nuisance claims must fail. Future
courts that hear public nuisance suits of any nature should follow the example
set by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in carefully analyzing the historical
boundaries of the tort to ensure that it does not morph into a remedy for all
harms.

